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RECENT DECISIONS
ANTITRUST LAW - COMBINATION IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE
- CoNsPIRACY To ELIMINATE DISCOUNT HOUSES As COM-
PETITORS IN AUTOMOBILE MARKET Hw VIOLATIVE OF SECTION
1 OF SHERMAN ACT.- A number of Chevrolet dealers par-
ticipated in agreements with "discount houses" which enabled con-
sumers to purchase new automobiles directly from the discounter.
General Motors subjected the participating dealers to individual
interviews which were sufficiently intimidating to elicit their promises
to abandon these agreements with the discounters. At the in-
sistance and with the aid of General Motors, the non-participating
dealer associations pursued a policing system to insure the per-
formance of the promises. The Supreme Court, in reversing the
decision of the district court, held that the collaborative action to
eliminate the discounters as competitors, and to deprive the par-
ticipating dealers of their freedom to deal with the discounters,
constituted an unlawful conspiracy in restraint of trade. United
States v. General Motors, 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
Rapid industrial growth after the Civil War, and the ensuing
growth of monopolies, forced Congress to act in order to preserve
a competitive economy.' The first antitrust legislation passed, and
the statute most widely used in litigation in this area, is the Sher-
man Act of 1890. Section 1 of this act provides that "every con-
tract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." I Congress drafted
this section in the light of the common law and in so doing bor-
rowed its terms and concepts.3 Its purpose was to eliminate only
those restraints on competition which constituted restraints of
trade; it was not designed to eliminate those restraints which were
ancilliary to a lawful business agreement.' Moreover, the section
has no application unless three conditions precedent are met. First,
there must be a contract, combination or conspiracy, i.e., joint,
concerted action; second, the joint action must be in restraint of
1 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533,
559 (1944); DOWLING & GUNTHER, CoNsTUTIoNAL LAW 220 (1965).
226 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
3 See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 498 (1939).
4United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 188 Fed. 127, 150-51
(C.C. Del. 1911); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271,
280-81 (6th Cir. 1898).
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interstate or foreign commerce; and third, the contract, combina-
tion or conspiracy must constitute an undue restraint of competition.
The definition of joint and collaborative activity has been
extremely perplexing for, the Supreme Court., In Dr. Miles Medical
Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.,6 decided in 1911, the Court held
that defendants' efforts to maintain the resale price of its products
by means of a system of written price maintenance contracts vio-
lated both the common law and the Sherman Act. United States
v. Colgate," however, found no Sherman Act violation despite the
fact that the manufacturer: (1) distributed to its dealers lists of
resale prices to be charged, stating that no deliveries would be
made to dealers who failed to comply; (2) requested information
concerning non-complying dealers; (3) sought and often received
promises of future adherence from offending dealers; and (4)
only resumed the normal sales relations with the dealers who gave
the requested promises. The Court stated that a manufacturer is
entirely free to exercise discretion in choosing the parties with
whom he wishes to deaL8 This case was distinguished from
Dr. Miles in that this indictment failed to charge the defendant
Colgate with selling to the dealers under agreements.9
In United States v. Schrader's Son, Inc.,'0 the Court was
confronted with a situation where a manufacturer caused its
wholesalers to adhere to specified resale prices by a system of
resale contracts. Relying on Colgate, the lower court found no
breach of the Sherman Act. In reversing, the Supreme Court
held that the court below had misinterpreted the Colgate decision, and
pointed out that its indictment had failed solely because it did
not charge either an express or implied agreement to set resale
prices. Thus, Dr. Miles had neither been modified nor overruled.
The same rationale was reiterated in Federal Trade Comn'n v.
Beech-Nut," and United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.'2
In Beech-Nut the defendant, employing an elaborate system to
enforce price maintenance policies, refused to sell to wholesalers
or retailers who did not observe its prices or who sold to other
dealers who did not cooperate. To enforce its policy it sought to,
and succeeded in, discovering uncooperative dealers by means of
the reports of other dealers, investigations of the company's
agents or by a process of marking and tracing the shipments
of its goods. The defendant reinstated undesirable customers
5 VAN CIsE, UNxmDsTAmNGa THE AxTTUST LAws 20-23 (1963).6220 U.S. 373 (1911).
7250 U.S. 300 (1919).
31d. at 307.
9Id. at 306-07.
10252 U.S. 85 (1920).
11-257 U.S. 441 (1922).
12 321 U.S. 707 (1944).
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only upon satisfactory assurances that their full cooperation
would be forthcoming. In reversing the circuit court, the
Supreme Court rejected the contention that the price main-
tenance policies were legal under the Colgate decision, since the
practices in question went far beyond a simple refusal to sell
to customers who would not resell at stated prices. A com-
bination in restraint of trade was sufficiently established by the
agreements, express or implied, between Beech-Nut and its
dealers, such agreements being quite effective to accomplish "sup-
pression of freedom of competition .... ," 13
Bausch & Lomb further expanded the concept of an agree-
ment. There, the evidence showed a price maintenance scheme
by means of a distribution system, whereby the distributor care-
fully selected and licensed wholesalers who were permitted to
sell only to retailers similarly licensed. The resale prices for
wholesalers were published and distributed to both wholesalers
and retailers, and the wholesaler's license was revoked if un-
authorized sales were made. Wholesalers were required to
distribute numbered certificates with each item sold so that the
distributor could easily trace unauthorized sales. The Court
stated that the seller may not go beyond a simple refusal to deal
with those who do not comply with the seller's policies. The
seller may not, even without any agreements, suppress "free-
dom of competition by coercion of its customers. . . .", 14 Indeed,
"whether this conspiracy and combination was achieved by agree-
ment or by acquiescence of the wholesalers . . . is immaterial." 15.
The significance of the preceding cases was clarified by
United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.' Representatives of a
manufacturer of pharmaceutical products visited retailers who
were advertising discount prices, and informed them that unless
the suggested prices were observed the defendant would no
longer deal with them. Agreements were elicited from the
wholesalers to stop delivering to offending retailers and sales
were only resumed after the delinquent retailer stopped selling
at discount prices. The Court found a conspiracy in restraint
of trade, and explained that while prior to the Beech-Nut de-
cision it was necessary to find an express or implied agreement,
a combination inconsistent with the Sherman Act will now be
found "when the manufacturer's actions . . . go beyond mere
announcement of his policy and the simple refusal to deal, and
13 Federal Trade Comnin v. Beech-Nut, 257 U.S. 441, 455 (1922).
4 United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 722
(1944).
15 Id. at 723.
10 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
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he employs other means which effect adherence to his .resaleprices . . .. ,, 17
In order to determine whether a particular joint action
constitutes a conspiracy in restraint of trade, the Court initially
devised the "rule of reason" test.'8 The classic definition of this
test is found in Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States.9 Mr.
Justice Brandeis, writing for the Court, stated that:
Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains.
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as
may suppress or even destroy competition.20
In applying the "rule of reason," the Court considers the par-
ticular business to which the restraint is applied, "its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the
restraint and its effect, actual or probable." 21
A second standard has been devised which is the antithesis
of the "rule of reason." This is the "per se" rule and according
to this standard, certain practices in restraint of trade and com-
merce are of such a character that they cannot be justified under
any market conditions, and hence there is no need to make a
showing of public injury.22 The "per se" philosophy probably
originated in United States v. Trenton Potteries Co. 2 3  There,
manufacturers controlling eighty per cent of the vitreous pottery
industry conspired to fix and maintain uniform prices for their
products. The Court disregarded the defendants' contention that
the agreement was reasonable, and stated that the practice of
price fixing is not justified as reasonable simply because the
fixed prices are reasonable.
In United States v,. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,2 4 major oil pro-
ducers conspired to fix the prices of crude oil and gasoline. In
affirming the Sherman Act convictions, Mr. Justice Douglas wrote:
"a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of
raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a
commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal 'per
se! "25
'7 Id. at 44.
28 Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
19 246 U.S. 231 (1918).20 Id. at 238.
21 Ibid.
2 2 
"Another philosophy, the 'per se" concept . . . has eroded the rule of
reason to such an extent that it threatens to undermine its very founda-
tion." Kalinowski, The Per Se Doctrine-An. Emerging Philosophy of
Anti-Trust Law, 11 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 569, 570 (1964).
23273 U.S. 392 (1927). See supra note 22, at 572.
24310 U.S. 150 (1940).
2 5 Id. at 223.
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: The "per se" rule also has been consistently applied when
a group boycott is designed solely to eliminate competition. 26
In Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. .v. Federal Trade
Comm'n,27 members of the fashion guild refused to sell to manu-
facturers and retailers who pirated the designs of the guild
members. To effectuate this boycott, the guild members used
blacklists, employed "shoppers" to visit stores to examine stocks,
audited books and imposed fines. The Court rejected the de-
fense that the practices were reasonable and stated that under
these circumstances it was not necessary to hear evidence in
this regard "for the reasonableness of the methods pursued by
the combination to accomplish its unlawful object is no more
material than would be the reasonableness of the prices fixed by
unlawful combination." 2 The application of the "per se" rule
to boycotts was crystallized in Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, Inc., 29 where a group of powerful businessmen conspired
to deprive a single merchant of the merchandise necessary to
compete effectively. The Court removed any doubt concerning
the previously required element of intent to eliminate competi-
tion, and stated that boycotts are not saved by allegations that
they are reasonable under the circumstances.
The instant case, in deciding whether the conduct of the
defendants constituted a conspiracy, indicated that the question
was not one of fact but rather one "of the legal standard re-
quired to be applied to the undisputed facts. .. ." 30 This legal
standard is that established by Beech-Nut, Bausch & Lomb and
Parke, Davis & Co.,31 i.e., the defendants in order to avoid a vio-
'lation of the Sherman Act, must act unilaterally, and may not
go beyond an announcement of policy and a simple refusal to
sell to participating dealers.
Here, dealers' associations, acting through some of their
members, complained to General Motors of the sales through
discounters. Subsequently, the dealers, at an association meet-
ing, agreed to initiate a letter-writing campaign for the purpose
of bringing General Motors into the dispute. The campaign
had immediate results. General Motors' personnel interviewed
every Chevrolet dealer in the area and elicited a promise from
each dealer that he would not do business with the discounters.
Having obtained the desired promises, the dealers' associations
-organized the policing of the agreements. Information obtained
26 Note, 47 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1959).
27312 U.S. 457 (1941).
281d. at 468.
29 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
30 384 U.S. 127, 141 n.16 (1966).
31 Id. at 142.
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by the investigating committee was relayed to the manufacturer
upon its request and used to elicit compliance from non-conform-
ing dealers. As a result of this joint activity and the pressure
which was brought to bear, a number of dealers repurchased,
at a substantial loss, cars which they had previously sold through
a discounter.
When measured by the correct rule, the collaborative efforts
of the defendants "can by no stretch of the imagination be de-
scribed as 'unilateral' or merely 'parallel.'" 22 Neither the in-
dividual dealers, the associations, nor General Motors acted in-
dependently. The dealers collaborated among themselves, through
the associations and with the manufacturer, first to obtain aid
from General Motors and then to enforce the promises the
manufacturer induced. There was an explicit agreement to
police the promises and an investigating committee worked closely
with General Motors. Thus, as was the case in Parke, Davis
& Co., general compliance was induced by obtaining substantially
interdependent promises from dealers not to do business with
the discounters. These activities amounted to a "classic con-
spiracy in restraint of trade." 3
The Court then pointed out what has been clear since the
Klor decision-that a conspiracy to boycott even a single trader,
is by its nature a "per se" violation of the act. The effect
of the joint activities was to deprive the discounters of their
free access to the automobile market. As a "per se" violation,
the activity is presumed illegal without further inquiry into the
economic motivation of the defendants or the possible reason-
ableness of the activity.
In addition, the Court found a second "per se" offense in-
herent in this particular combination. The record contained ample
evidence that one of the conspirators" purposes was to protect the
complaining dealers from price competition. Letters sent to Gen-
eral Motors, as part of the letter-writing campaign, contained num-
erous complaints about the low prices offered by the discounters.
The manufacturer itself was concerned about the quotation of the
discounted prices to the general public and the substantially lower
interest rate charged by some of the discounters for new-car
financing.
The opinion 'ndicated that even if the trial record had not
established that restraint of competition was an objective of the
conspiracy, a conspiracy to remove a class of competitors from
access to the market would have the equivalent effect on price
competition. It too could amount to -a conspiratorial restraint
of price competition and hence a "per se" offense.
32 Id. at 145.33 Id. at 140.
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. The contracts between General Motors and its dealers con-
tained a location clause which prohibited the franchised dealer
from establishing "a different location... or place of business ...
without the prior written approval of Chevrolet." 31 General Motors
contended that the sale to discounters was in violation of this
clause and they had the contract right to prohibit it. The Court,
however, because of its decision that there was a conspiracy, never
reached the issue of whether the location clause prohibited the
sale of autos by dealers to discounters.
Assuming arguendo that the location clause does prohibit the
dealers from making agreements with discounters, the question
arises as to whether General Motors could enforce this clause
without violating the Sherman Act. Mr. Justice Harlan, con-
curring in the decision of the Court, believed that General Motors
could legally enforce it by unilateral action and found nothing in
the majority opinion to the contrary. 5 On the other hand, the
Government argued that if the location clause is construed as
including sales through the discounters it is a contract in restraint
of interstate commerce and therefore its enforcement would vio-
late the Sherman Act.86
The district court, interpreting the facts as meaning that
General Motors was acting to enforce a contractual obligation
which the dealers had assumed, reasoned that since the dealers
are free to sell at any price they choose, and may compete with
the other franchised dealers in the area as vigorously as they
desire, the contracts did not violate the Sherman Act. 37  The
court argued that to conclude otherwise would be to insist that
the manufacturer's establishment of standards for its dealers con-
sisted of, an unreasonable restraint of trade. The district court
found the Chicago Bd. of Trade rule precedent for the instant
case concluding that the location clause did not suppress, but,
rather, promoted competition and benefited the automobile
consumer.38
However reasonable the argument of the district court and
Mr. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion may appear as a justi-
fication for unilateral action on the part of General Motors, the
hard fact still remains that the scheme does and would continue
to eliminate the discounters as competitors. 39 The majority opinion
in the instant case indicated that elimination of -a class of traders
34 Id. at 130.
35 Id. at 149.36United States v. General Motors, 234 F. Supp. 85, 87-88 (S.D. Cal.
1964).
3 Id. at 88.
38 Ibid.
39 The district court conceded that the plan eliminated the discounters as
competitors. Id. at 88-89.
262", [ VOL. 41
RECENT DECISIONS
from access to the market was a "per se" offense. Moreover, it
was indicated that any elimination by conspiracy or combination
is equivalent to a conspiracy or combination to restrain price
competition, a goal illegal "per se." Thus, if it is illegal to con-
spire to a particular end, it would seem illegal to contract to
that same end.
It should be pointed out that General Motors might also en-
counter "conspiratorial" difficulties in attempting unilateral
enforcement of the provision. In Patterson v. United States,4
the court, when confronted with a conspiracy in restraint of trade on
the part of the officers and agents of a corporation, held that Sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act "includes conspiracies between com-
petitors, or between the officers and agents of a competitor on
its behalf against a competitor." 41
If there is an unreasonable restraint on interstate commerce,
it may result just as readily from a conspiracy on the part of those
associated under common ownership as from a conspiracy on the
part of those unassociated. 42  Thus, if the location clause, in and
of itself, were found to be the product of a conspiracy within the
corporate structure, it is conceivable that it would be violative of the
Sherman Act.
There can be little doubt that the instant decision is in line
with and controlled by Parke, Davis & Co. Mr. Justice Harlan
concedes this in his concurring opinion, but claims that that case
"represents basically unsound antitrust doctrine. 
. . .,,43 because
that opinion for practical purposes eliminated the manufacturer's
right to prescribe, in advance, the conditions upon which he will
refuse to sell. 4  The instant decision, however, seems to be
within the spirit of the antitrust laws and of the Sherman Act in
particular, "whose purpose was .. . to make . . .so far as Con-
gress could under our dual system, a competitive business
economy." 45
ANTITRUST LAw - MERGERS - SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON
ACT VIOLATED BY POTENTIAL THREAT TO COMPETITIN.-In an
antitrust action, the United States charged that the merger of two
competing grocery companies, creating the second largest chain in
40M2f Fed. 599 (6th Cir. 1915).
41 Id. at 618.
42 United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
43 United States v. General Motors, 384 U.S. 127, 148 (1966).
44 See Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent in United States v. Parke, Davis &
Co., 362 U.S. 29, 48 (1960).4 5 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 559
(1944).
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